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Notes and Comments
Herbert Marx*

The Energy Crisis and the
Emergency Power in Canada

1. Introduction
The Energy Supplies Emergency Act passed on January 11, 1974
does not have a preamble. However, it would seem that the long
title of the Act incorporates in resum6 fashion what a preamble
would normally contain. The raison d'tre of the Act is set out in
the title which is as follows: "An Act to provide a means to
conserve the supplies of petroleum products within Canada during
periods of national emergency caused by shortages or market
disturbances affecting the national security and welfare and the
economic stability of Canada.

.

." The Act was adopted after the

1973 Yom Kippur War when there was a threat of a fuel oil and
gasoline shortage. However, no significant shortage has
materialized as yet.
Section 11(1) of the Act provides for the declaration of a national
emergency: "When the Governor in Council is of the opinion that a
national emergency exists by reason of actual of anticipated
shortages of petroleum or disturbances in the petroleum markets that
affect or will affect the national security and welfare and the
economic stability of Canada, and that it is necessary in the national
interest to conserve the supplies of petroleun products within
Canada.

.

." The subsequent sub-sections specify that a notice of

motion to approve the declaration is to be tabled in both Houses of
Parliament and the declaration is to be revoked if the House of
Commons negatives the motion.'
Once the Act is in force a "mandatory allocation program"
(s. 12) for the distribution of petroleum products is set up by the
Energy Supplies Allocation Board that is established by s.3 of the
Act. The Board has extensive regulatory powers (s.16) and it can
*Herbert Marx, Associate Professor of Law, University of Montreal.
1. The motion moved by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources concerning
the laying of a declaration before Parliament provided that it would be revoked if
negatived by either House of Parliament . This was modified on a motion proposed
by Stanley Knowles (see, House of Commons Debates, January 9, 1974 at 9212
and 9215).
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specifically regulate imports (s. 17) or exports (s. 18). It may also,
with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into
arrangement with provincial authorities concerning the regulation
and pricing of electric power (s.15). Rationing is provided for in
sections 19 and 20. Provisions relating to contractual obligations
affected by regulations adopted under the Act, restrictive trade
practices, environmental problems, transportation and enforcement
of the Act are set out in sections 21 to 32.
A mandatory allocation program terminates at the latest twelve
months after coming into force unless terminated earlier by an order
of the Governor in Council, and it can be extended for twelve month
periods (s. 35). The Act itself expires June 30, 1976 (s. 37). As of
June 1975 the Act has not been proclaimed in force. This note will
briefly explore two questions raised by the adoption of this Act, its
constitutional foundation and its constitutional litigation.
2.

The Constitutional Foundation of the Energy Supplies
Emergency Act
It can be argued that the constitution authority for the Act can be
found in the enumerated paragraphs or in the introductory paragraph
of section 91 of the B.N.A. Act. I would suggest, however, that
predicating the Act on the emergency power derived from the
introductory paragraph of s.91 would give the government the
widest powers and mke it easiest to defend the constitutionality of
the Act.
The following heads of s.91 can be cited in support of federal
intervention in controlling petroleum supplies: no 2., the regulation
of trade and commerce; no. 7, the defence power; no. 10,
navigation and shipping; no. 13, ferry services; and the implicit
heads of power founded on the federal jurisdiction over aeronautics
and interprovincial or international transportation. To this should be
added the local works and undertakings under federal jurisdiction by
virtue of s.92 head 10 (c) of the B.N.A. Act. However, even the
aggregate of all the enumerated or equivalent powers would fall
short of offering the federal government the complete and
untramelled authority that it may find necessary to exercise in order
to cope with an energy crisis.
Of the powers mentioned above it is essentially the trade and
commerce power that would offer some scope for a mandatory
allocation scheme. The other powers, although of some importance,
would permit a very limited control over petroleum supplies. It is
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unquestionable that the commerce power does permit the regulation
of imports and exports (ss. 18 and 19 of the Act) and the
determination of the market area for imports (see, s. 16 (1) (m)). In
Caloil Inc. v. A.-G. of Canada2 the Supreme Court held that a
regulatory scheme providing for the importation into restricted areas
of Canada of petroleum products was incidental to federal
jurisdiction over extraprovincial trade and commerce.
Although the Act is predicated on a supply crisis of petroleum, it
would appear that the commerce clause would not permit total and
effective federal control over a purely local problem - for
example, an acute shortage of gasoline in the metropolitan Toronto
area or in Saint-Louis de Ha! Ha!, Quebec. As well, it may be
desirable to couple an allocation scheme with price fixing as is
suggested by s. 16 (1) (1) of the Act. 3 It is arguable whether the
trade and commerce head covers regulation of prices of products
moving in interprovincial commerce, and it surely does not apply to
4
purely intraprovincial transactions.
The introductory paragraph of s.91 of the B.N.A. Act has given
birth to three theoretical formulations for the exercise of federal
powers - a residual power, an emergency power, and a power to
deal with questions of national dimensions or of national interest.
The allocation of petroleum supplies does not fall wholly under the
residual power insofar as it is dealt with in s.92 of the B.N.A. Act.
As well, it would be quite difficult to defend such allocation as
being under federal jurisdiction because the matter is one of national
dimensions. If the subject matter of petroleum energy supplies can
be justified as being under federal jurisdiction by virtue of the
national dimensions theory, the provinces would be ousted from
what have long been considered traditional areas of provincial
jurisdiction. And, if petroleum allocation falls under permanent
federal control, what is next? To so decide would also require
tortuous distinguishing, if not outright overruling, of Judical
Committee and Supreme Court decisions.
2. [1971]S.C.R. 543; 20 D.L.R. (3d) 472.
3. Section 16 (1) (1) provides that the Board may make regulations "prescribing
the prices at which, or range of prices within which, any controlled product may be
sold by suppliers to wholesale customers in particular market areas or generally and
prescribing, except for pipeline companies governed by the NationalEnergy Board
Act, the charges for transportation between market areas".
4. See, e.g., Rand, J. in Reference re the Farm ProductsMarketing Act (Ontario),
[1957] S.C.R. 198 at 208 ff; 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257 at 276 ff.
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Federal legislation based on the emergency power means that a
new aspect of the business of Government is recognized as
emerging" 5 , an aspect which falls under federal jurisdiction for the
limited duration of the emergency. It is essential for the validity of
emergency legislation that it clearly be of a temporary nature as is
the case with the Energy Supplies Emergency Act.
During the prolonged economic depression of the 1930's the
Federal Parliament adopted unemployment insurance legislation in
order to cope with the crsis. In the Employment Insurance
Reference, counsel for the government characterized the problem
and the federal burden as follows: "With regard to the facts which
show the seriousness of the situation, the highest percentage of
unemployed was 32.9, in March, 1933. By August, 1935, it was
down to 17.4 per cent. Eleven per cent was regarded by the
statistical department as normal; but is was seasonal to some extent.
Relief measures were adopted from 1930 to 1935, and the
expenditure of the Dominion Government to relieve the unemployment situation during that period amounted to $192,291,683."6
Surely this was an emergency! However, the federal legislation
could not be supported as falling under the emergency doctrine
because the "operation [of the Act was] intended to be
7
permanent".
It should be emphasized that neither the Judical Committee of the
Privy Council nor the Supreme Court of Canada has ever hinted that
the emergency power should be restricted to a war or insurrection
related emergency. No doubt federal emergency legislation could
override provincial jurisdiction in cases of famine or of an
epidemic, to cite only two of the extreme examples favoured by the
Judical Committee of the Privy Council. Though their Lordships did
not validate the federal economic legislation of the 1930's because it was not perceived as that extraordinary peril that would
justify federal intervention - their interpretation was coloured, at
least in part, by the fact that the proposed legislation, if held
5. Fort FrancesPulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co., [1923] A.C.

695 at 705; [1923] 3 D.L.R. 629 at 634; On the emergency power generally, see H.
Marx, The Emergency Powerand CivilLibertiesin Canada (1970), 16 McGill L.J.

39; H. Marx, The "Apprehended Insurrection" of October 1970 and the Judicial
Function, (1972), 7 U.B.C.L. Rev. 55.
6. A.-G.for Canada v. A.-G.for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 355 at 359; (Also reported
but without argument [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684).
7. Id. at 366.
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constitutional, would have permanently altered the division of
powers set out in the B.N.A. Act.
If the Energy Supplies Emergency Act is made operational there
would not really be any pressing issue related to the division of
powers. Surely the Supreme Court would not deny to the federal
government temporary powers approved by the House of
Commons. The federal principle - that both the federal and
provincial governments be limited to their own sphere - would
only be temporarily suspended not permanently eradicated. As well,
such suspension would be restricted to infringement over a limited
portion of provincial jurisdiction and only for a particular product.
During the Korean "Police Action" the Parliament of Canada
adopted The Emergency Powers Act 8 in order to make adequate
defence preparations and to prevent economic disruptions.
Essentially the Act provided the Governor in Council with the very
wide powers the government could exercise under the War
Measures Act 9 except that the power to interfere with civil liberties
was expressly excluded. The duration of the Act was a little over
one year and provision was made for its continuance upon addresses
of both Houses of Parliament. The constitutional validity of the Act
was never questioned before the courts. However, given the
international and domestic circumstances at the time it most
probably could not have been successfully impugned. Besides,
temporary federal emergency legislation has never been successfully challenged in Canada.
3.

The Constitutional Litigation of the Energy Supplies
Emergency Act
In any constitutional litigation of the Energy Supplies Emergency
Act the burden of proof would be on the plaintiff to show that the
Act is unconstitutional. As well, the Act would benefit from the
presumption of constitutionality that is applicable to all legislation,
whether it be federal or provincial. Considering that plaintiff
already has two strikes against him, and in view of other handicaps
that he will face, it is rather doubtful that he will reach first base in
this litigation as to the validity of the Act.
The plaintiff's only possible attack would be to show that an
emergency does not in fact exist or that it never existed and
8. S.C. 1950-51,c. 5.
9. Now found in R. S.C. 1970, c. W-2.
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consequently that the Act cannot constitutionally be made or remain
operational.
The provisions of s. 11 (1) of the Act that make it operational are
somewhat different from those found in s.2 of the War Measures
Act that have the same function. The latter Act provides that the
issuance of a proclamation that an emergency exists is "conclusive
evidence" that the emergency "exists and has existed for any
period of time therein stated" (s.2). The question at issue in
litigating any emergency legislation would relate to the validity of
making the emergency legislation operational. That is, the argument
would be that Parliament cannot trench on provincial jurisdiction,
that it cannot unilaterally alter the division of powers between itself
and the provincial legislatures in the absence of a valid emergency
situation. However, the clause as set out in section 2 of the War
Measures Act is not an obstacle to the constitutional litigation
envisaged here because Parliament cannot insulate itself from
judicial review on a question concerniolg federal/provincial
jurisdiction. 10

The following dicta of the Judical Committe of the Privy Council
are set out in full because they are central to any litigation of federal
emergency legislation. It was stated in the Fort Frances case: "It
may be that it has become clear that the crisis which arose is wholly
at an end and that there is no justification for the continued exercise
of an exceptional interference which becomes ultra vires when it is
no longer called for. In such a case the law as laid down for the
distribution of powers in the ruling instrument [the B.N.A. Act]
would have to be invoked. But very clear evidence that the crisis has
wholly passed away would be required to justify the judiciary, even
when the question raised was one of ultra vires which it had to
decide, in overruling the decision of the Government that
exceptional measures were still requisite." 1 '
This statement was repeated in the Japanese Canadians case as
follows, with the added reference as to an emergency that never
arose. "Again, if it be clear that an emergency has not arisen, or no
longer exists, there can be no justification for the exercise or
continued exercise of the exceptional powers. The rule of law as to
the distribution of powers between the Parliament of the Dominion
10. See, e.g., British Columbia Power Corporation Ltd. v. British Columbia

Electric Co. Ltd., [1962] S.C.R. 642; 34 D.L.R. (2d) 196.
11. Supra, [1923] A.C.695 at 706; [1929] 3 D.L.R. 629 at635.
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and the Parliaments of the Provinces comes into play. But very clear
evidence that an emergency has not arisen, or that the emergency no
longer exists, is required to justify the judiciary, even though the
question is one of ultra vires, in overruling the decision of the
Parliament of the Dominion that exceptional measures were
required or were still required." ' 12 This dicta was subsequently
followed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Leasehold
Reference. 13
In sum, the plaintiff can attack the implementation of the Energy
Supplies Emergency Act, but to succeed he must prove that a
petroleum supply crisis never existed or that if it existed, it has
ceased to so exist. He must furthermore present "very clear
evidence" on this point. Is it practically possible to discharge this
burden of proof?
The Governor in Council can bring the Act into operation when
he "is of the opinion that a national emergency exists by reason of
actual or anticipated shortages of petroleum or disturbances in the
petroleum markets" (s.11 (1)). We have here two kinds of
shortages; those that are actual and those that are apprehended. I
would suggest that if it is not impossible to present "very clear
evidence" that actual shortages or market disturbances do not exist,
it is virtually impossible to make such proof as to apprehended
shortages or disturbaces. If, for example, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries states that petroleum prices will rise
ten per cent and production will go down by the same percentage,
could not the Governor in Council legitimately anticipate, perceive
or apprehend a national emergency due to a petroleum shortage or
market disturbances?
It also appears that it would be equally difficult to prove that the
adoption of the regulations under the emergency legislation was for
an extraneous purpose. It would be necessary to prove bad faith that the Governor in Council acted in order to achieve an
unauthorized or forbidden purpose. This issue was raised in A. -G.
for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd. 14 where the statutory
construction of the 1945 National Emergency TransitionalPowers
12. Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadiansv. A. -G. for Canada, [1947]
A.C. 87 at 102; [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 at 585-6.
13. Reference the Validity of the Wartime Leasehold Regulations, [ 1950] S.C.R.
124, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 1.
14. [1952] A.C. 427; [1952] 3 D.L.R. 433 (sub nom. A.-G. of Canada v. Nolan
and Hallet& Carey Ltd.).
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Act 15 was considered. The Privy Council gave as the "true answer"
to the question of purpose, the statement of Duff, C.J. in the
Chemicals Reference who wrote: "I cannot agree that it is
competent to any court to canvass the considerations which have, or
may have, led him to deem such regulations necessary or advisable
for the transcendent objects set forth. . .The words are too plain for
dispute: the measures authorized [by the War Measures Act] are
such as the Governor General in Council (not the courts) deems
necessary or advisable."1 6 In addition the concurrence of the House
of Commons is necessary for keeping the Energy Supplies
Emergency Act operational.
When the question of the validity of emergency legislation is
raised in a federal advisory opinion the difficulties of having it ruled
ultra vires are compounded. In the Leasehold Reference it appears
that there was little factual, if any, material before the court. The
judges took judicial notice of what was of public knowledge as well
as what was stated in the Order of Reference. Obviously the latter
document would not include information that would suggest that the
court overrule the action of the Governor in Council. 17
The "very clear evidence" rule linked to the necessity of proving
a negative - that an emergency never arose or does not exist makes it highly improbable that the Supreme Court would set aside
what the Government and Parliament thought a necessary action in
order to cope with what is perceived as a national emergency. The
very temporary nature of any federal infringement on provincial
jurisdiction would also tend to inhibit judicial intervention.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be noted that executive action in
proclaiming an emergency is subject to parliamentary approval and
control. 18 Furthermore, the Energy Supplies Emergency Act expires
15. S.C. 1945, c. 60.
16. [1952] A.C. at 445; [1952)3 D.L.R. at 442, citingReference re the Validity of
the Regulationsin Relation to Chemicals, [1943] S.C.R. 1 at 13; [1943] 1 D.L.R.

248 at 256.
17. See the LeaseholdReference, [1950] S.C.R. at 127; [1950] 2 D.L.R. at 4. On
this point also see, A. -G. for Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association
[1971] S.C.R. 689 at 704 (per Laskin J.); 19 D.L.R. (3d) 169 at 181.
18. In the United States, Presidential emergency edicts of the 1930's are still in
force. As well, Congress has not exercised the same control as has its Canadian
counterpart. See, Emergency Powers Statutes, Senate Report, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
No. 93-549 (1973) and Executive Orders in Times of War and National
Emergency, Senate Report, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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on June 30, 1976 so that if the crisis arises after that date new
emergency legislation would be required. This expiry provision is
not required insofar as it could have been provided that the Act
remain dormant and be made operational only if and when required.
Considering the real possibility of a petroleum shortage in the near
future, not only should the legislative vehicle be in readiness at all
times but machinery to deal with such an emergency should always
be well oiled.

